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27 
In 1971 Japanese export attained the level of 24,000 million dollars (her import-
19,700 million dollars and her excess of export over import-4,300 million dollars). In 
the same year the share of Japan in the world trade except the socialist bloc was 7.7% 
(6.9% in 1970). In export Japan ranked third place in the world next to U. S. A. and 
West Germany, while in import it secured the fifth next to U. S. A., West Germany, Great 
Britain, and France. 
Obvilously this big increase of export of 24,000 million dollars (of 24% increase in 
comparison to the previous year) was partially brought about by the leases (encourage-
ment of import by the partners or advance payment), in an expectation of an inevitability 
of the multilateral adjustment of exchange rates on the global scale, that is, of the raising 
of the exchange rate of Japanese yen, with the Nixon Statement of August 15,1971 or the 
so-called Nixon shock as a turning point (a new economic policy of U. S. A.; i.e., the 
suspension of the exchange of gold and dollars: it suggested the death of the IMF system, 
and, at the same time, the fact that the statement was dated on August 15, that is, on the 
Japanese memorial day of the defeat in the war, even though it was in American time, is 
to be a historical indication that the policy of U. S. A. toward Japan faced a new stage). 
However, when we recall the fact that Japan ranked thirty-third place in the world with 
103 million dollar export in 1946 immediately after the World War II and with 170 million 
dollar export in 1947 (about 10% of the prewar export), and that the volume of Japanese 
export fell to a level lower than that of India, Malay, Hong Kong, Philippines, and 
Indonesia, we can not but marvel at the remarkable advancement of recovery of the 
Japanese trade in a quarter of a century (a growth of approximately 185 times as much). 
Further, we have to note that Japan accomplished it under the fixed exchange rate system 
(I U.S. dollar=360 Japanese yen) which lasted for the postwar twenty-two years 
(1949-1971) (readers may also recall that the Japanese gold standard or the fixed exchange 
rate, had undergone twenty years of hardships beginning in 1897). I do not intend to 
describe in detail the transition or the history of the Japanese trade which accomplished 
the surprising development in these twenty-five years. Rather, I would try to elucidate 
the essential property and character of the postwar Japanese trade which carried out this 
* Professor. 
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rapid recovery and growth, and, at the same time, to define the international standing of 
the contemporary Japanese capitalism through the analysis of its external aspects expressed 
in trade. In the following delineation with my viewpoint set as such, I will mainly deal 
with the trends or trend aspects of the issue, and will abstract the circulating aspects. Also 
I want to note at the outset that I will discuss only briefly in relation to the Japanese foreign 
aids, the movement of capital and of technology, which are as important or perhaps more 
important than foreign trade in the foreign economic relations ofJapan
'
). 
Now, in order to understand the structural property of the Japanese trade which had 
been formed in the period of the so-called high growth (the period of the full-scale estab-
lishment of heavy and chemical industries in Japan) covering 1955-1970 after the period 
of convalescence covering 1946-1955, it is necessary to deal above all with the relation 
between the prewar Japanese capitalism and foreign trade, or their properties, to some 
extent. 
I The Prewar Japanese Capitalism and the Foreign Trade 
1. Three-link Thesis of Prof. T. Nawa 
It goes without saying that the Japanese capitalism had developed since the Meiji Era 
in close relation with the foreign trade (as to this point, refer in detail to, Matsui, K., The 
Japanese Trade (in Japanese), 1950; Matsui, K., ed., The History of the Modern Japanese 
Trade (in Japanese), 3 vols., 1959-1963). What is discussed here in comparison with the 
present stage, however, is the relation between the prewar Japanese capitalism and the 
foreign trade, or their properties, at least in the stage of imperialism which had 
something in common in quality with the present. In his three-link thesis, Prof. Toichi 
Nawa formulated the relation between the prewar Japanes" capitalism and the foreign 
trade in this stage2). By extracting the following three important links, i.e., the funda-
mental trade relations, Prof. Nawa analyzed how the dependence on the world market 
and the limitation of the Japanese economy was prescribed concretely in terms of trade 
commodity items and in terms to the relations to trade partners. 
The first link: Raw silk vs. raw cotton and machinery between Japan 
and U. S. A. In 1936, it accounted for 24.5% in export and 31.9% in import. 
The second link: Cotton cloth vs. raw materials for heavy industries between 
Japan and the British Empire; it accounted for 28.3% in export and 31.9% in 
import. 
The third link: Machinery and miscellaneous commodities vs. foods and 
raw materials between Japan, and Manchuria and China (the so-called yen 
bloc); it accounted for 23.5% in export and 14.0% in import. Besides this, 
trades with Formosa and Korea are added. 
-------
1) As to the postwar Japanese foreign investment, refer to, Ono, K., "Japanese Foreign Investment 
after the World War II", in Matsui, K., ed., Liberalization o/Capital (in Japanese), 1970. 
2) Nawa, T., Japanese Textile IndustT), and the Problem rif Raw Cotton (in Japanese), 1937; Nawa, T. The 
Japanese Capitalism and the Problem of Trade (in Japanese), 1948. 
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Further, the features of these three links are pointed out by Prof. Nawa respectively 
as follows: 
The first link: Raw silk, which is a product of sericulture labor by petty 
farmers as a side job and of the yarn industry for manufacturing domestic prod-
ucts, is nearly the only commodity that Japan can export as a genuine Japanese 
commodity produced with labor from the land. Naturally, it is a starting point 
in the cycle of Japaneseforeign trade. However, in U.S.A., it is not necessities ofthe 
public but a demand for luxuries which is most subject to the business fluctu-
ation. Therefore, raw silk trade constitutes exactly an "Achilles' tendon" in the 
Japanese capitalistic economy. Raw cotton which can be obtained in exchange 
with raw silk is a product of great capitalistic agriculture by machinery, for 
which U. S. A. maintains a monopolistic position in the world market. The 
import of raw cotton is vital to Japan as a material for cotton cloth to be exported 
in second link. The import of high-class machinery and crude oil is a matter of 
primary urgency in semi-wartime or wartime economy, and along with it the 
first link, i.e., trade between Japan and U. S. A. explicitly assumes an unfavor-
able unequal exchange relation against Japan. 
The second link: The trade with the territories of the British Empire which 
succeeded to the first link consists of export of cotton products and import of raw 
materials for heavy industries (iron, pig iron, nonferrous metals, alminum, raw 
rubber, etc.). In one aspect, it bears a nature of trade with colonies, or of semi-
colonial trade, where it had to face an intense competition with the advanced 
cotton industry of Lancashire, or the political power of the British Empire. The 
second link could be prescribed as a mixed or an intermediate trade pattern 
between the patterns of the first and the third link. 
The third link: In the trade with the colonies, Manchuria and China, a 
pattern of genuine colonial trade of the exploiting imperialism was clearly 
observed. Means of production such a. machinery and so on, textile products 
and other wide-ranging miscellaneous products were exported, while foods and 
raw materials were monopolistically imported rejecting foreign powers. 
Such was the pattern of manifestation in trade, of the peculiar Japanese capitalism. 
Through such a trade mechanism, the entire mechanism ofthe semi-feudal and militaristic 
Japanese imperialism had been supported. Moreover, on this occasion a conflict with 
either U. S. A. or the British Empire was big enough to confuse the entire mechanism of 
the Japanese capitalism. So as to avoid and alleviate such contradictions, the solution of 
problems was sought in the third link with the military power as a background, and the 
construction and extension of the previledged markets took place. "For military invasion, 
for the armament of economy and for heavy industrialization was indispensable and the 
extensive import of raw materials and high-class machinery or weapons was needed, for 
which continual enlargement of export was an essential premise in compensation." In 
other words, it was handicapped in the sense that "the first and tlw second link had to serve 
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as the media and to function as the preliminary process for the turnover qf the third link qf trade", as 
intended (Nawa, T., ibid. The italics are added by K. Ono). In addition, a movement 
for shifting a center of gravity to the third link, i.e., the invasion to the continent, neces-
sarily invited at once a friction, i.e., redivision of the market with the existing powers of 
the western imperialism; besides, it had to meet a sharp resistance of the Chinese and other 
Asian nations. 
Such an analysis by Prof. Nawa on the relation of Japanese capitalism to foreign trade 
with a view point in the theory of reproduction had several methodological drawbacks as 
are pointed out by subsequent writers. For example, (1) It found a decisiveness in 
horizontal development, i.e., dependence on foreign trade in compensation for the narrow 
domestic market due to the low labor wages. (2) It did not enough to analyse concretely 
the old colonies of Korea and Formosa which were the major member countries of the 
third link. This enfeebled a comprehension of the importance of the role of the third 
link and its significance. Especially, it lacked an analysing the role of the trade as an 
essential condition of low wage level caused by import from colonies. (3) In general, 
since an emphasis was placed on the frailty of the Japanese capitalism centering around 
the issues of raw materials, the grasp on export remained fixed and abstract. (4) It did 
not evaluate the change of the Japanese industrial structure and the trend of increase in the 
export of heavy and chemical industrial products after 1931 (the Manchurian Incidence). 
(5) Because the comprehension was made in three trade links and because solution of 
the contradictions was oriented toward the third link, rather understanding of the 
significance of the markets of Southeast Asian colonies, which played an important role 
in the Japanese industrialization (for example, Philippines, Indochina, Indonesia, etc.) 
except the British Empire bloc was lacking. (6) Further, decisions on the period for 
forming and establishing these links, i.e., the indication of their historical positions, were 
completely omitted. 
In spite of these drawbacks, the three-link thesis of Prof. Nawa excelled the two-link 
thesis, which grasps the Japanese trade from raw silk vs. raw cotton with U. S. A. and 
that of cotton products vs. raw materials for heavy industries with the British Empire, by 
Freda Utley in her book titled Japan's Feet qfClay (1937, Chapter 2) which had motivated 
Prof. N awa to develop his conception. The three-link thesis of Prof. N awa exceeded in 
the following points: he not only increased the number of links, but, as is mentioned 
earlier, he defined the first link as a starter and pointed out that the limited, subordinate 
position and the function of Japan in the first and the second link eventually determined 
and promoted Japanese dominance and pillage in the third link. In this point he also 
deserves a merit. However, the importance of raw silk trade with U. S. A. had already 
been discussed by J. E. Orchard. He pointed out the polarization and the frailty of the 
export structure which depended mainly on raw silk and cotton products (both the exports 
hold 65%-70% of the total amount of export during 1924-1927 of which raw silk acccount-
ed for 40%). He had also pointed out underlying danger that particularly export of 
the main item, i.e., raw silk, depended on U. S. A. as its only market (95% was with 
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u. S. A.), and that it makes the foundation of Japanese industrialization insecure'). 
But in either case, it would be able to mention that the three-link thesis of Prof. 
Nawa at that time had a distinct fundamental predominance in all structural grasping the 
relation between prewar Japanese capitalism and foreign trade. 
2. Prewar International Balance of Payments 
Let's bring the discussion back to the balance of payments of Japan in the time when 
the three-link thesis of Prof. Nawa was presented. 
In the balance of trade of Japan in this period, import chronically exceeded export. 
After the relinquishment of maintaining the fixed rate system (December 1931), which 
lasted for about two years due to the lifting of gold embargo (1930), the Japanese exchange 
rate dropped and an effort to promoting export due to it made the Japanese export increase 
in spite of the global depression, and exactly this was to spread throughout the world with 
a fear for social dumping of Japanese commodities. However, it hardly reversed the 
constancy of unfavorable balance of trade. On the contrary, the fall in the exchange 
invited rise in prices for indispensable imported raw materials and machinery, and by this 
it reinforced the deterioration of terms of trade. What is hidden on a yen basis becomes 
very apparent on a dollar basis. That is, in other words, when expressed in dollar, the 
volume of Japanese trade after the lifting of gold embargo fell below the level of 1926-1929 
before the lifting of gold embargo, and inversely the export price fell to 68 in 1935 against 
100 in 1928. Export increased in quantity to 185 in 1935 also against 100 in 1928, while 
the terms of trade fell to 71 (refer to Table I). 
How about the balance of invisible trade which forms the so-called invisible trade, 
the second item in the current account? This account usually includes freight insurance, 
receipt and payment concerning services as commission and so on, spending by tourists, 
Table 1. The Scale of Japanese Export and Import 
! Excess of Quantity index Price index Terms of Export Import import (1928~ 100) (1928~ 100) trade Year (million (million over export: (A) dollar) dollar) (million I 
I 
, 
! dollar) I Export Import Export (A)lImport (B), (B) 
1926-29 ! 924 1,047 123 116 
I 
105 94 96 98 
30 ! 709 762 53 i 103 I 92 73 76 95 
31 548 602 54 I 106 102 55 55 100 
32 384 401 , 17 I 125 101 57 65 89 
33 470 490 20 I 13B ! 105 68 83 82 
, 
34 636 677 41 
I 
163 112 67 , 93 72 
35 706 708 2 , 185 117 68 I 96 71 
36
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I 37 902 1,087 185 ! 211 137 76 126 ! 61 I I I 
U.S. Tanff Commit ee, ed., Development cif Postwar Japanese Trade, Japanese edition by the Federation 
of Economic Organizations, Japan, 1958, p. 51. The figures do not include trade within country. 
3) j. E. Orchard pointed out the start from raw silk trade toward U.S.A. and the limitation. J. E. 
Orchard, Japan's Economic Position, the Progress cif Industrialization, 1930, pp. 429-30. 
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interest, income from dividends, remittance of immigrants, etc. In the international 
balance of payments, except the capital movement which will later be discussed, losses in 
trade balance can be offset by gains in balance of invisible trade, and so the constant excess 
of import over export in the trade balance of Japan has been offset to some degree by gains 
in balance of invisible trade. What contributed most to such gains was nothing but the 
income from marine transportation brought by huge mercantile marines which was 
protected and fostered as a carrier of development the Japanese capitalism. On the other 
hand, interest and income from dividends were trifle due to the poor accumulation of 
capital except the investment in China (this also included many defective obligations). 
Nevertheless, the payment for interests and dividends for foreign loans and foreign capitals 
which repleted the deficiency of capitals of Japan exceeded by far and this item suffered 
from constant red figures. 
The balance of capital movement, which was included in the extraordinary items in 
the prewar Japanese sheet of international balance of payments resulted in the constant 
loss (net increase in capital export) after 1930, by a marked decrease in the induction of 
foreign capitals, which usually made up for capital shortage of Japan and relieved a 
pressure from constant and chronicall deficit in the international balance of payments of 
Japan. This was caused, on one hand, as a result of a tendency towards increasing 
antagonism against Great Britain and U. S. A. which originated in the Manchurian 
Incidence, an increase in the investment to Manchuria after the Incidence, and, on the 
other hand, as a result of the suspension of the gold standard of 1931, the falling trend in 
exchange, the Capital Flight Prevention Act of 1932, and prevention and control over 
capital flight, exchange speCUlation and so on through the Foreign Exchange Control Act 
of 1933 which complemented and reinforced the former act. 
Thus, deterioration in the balance of trade and increase in the red figures of balance of 
capital account exceeded gains in the invisible current account with continuing outflow 
of gold after 1931 (Table 4). A movement for shifting of market in an attempt to relieve 
the balance against Great Britain and U. S. A., i.e., the enlargement of the third link afore-
mentioned, or the formation of the so-called Japan-Manchuria-China economic bloc, 
hardly provided sufficient markets for raw materials in place of Anglo-American bloc, 
because of the low productivity due to the pre-capitalistic character, the backwardness of 
these markets in spite of the increase in overseas investments from Japan. Rather, it 
worsened still more the balance against Great Britain and U. S. A. as it accompanied the 
increase in these overseas investment from Japan. 
After 1931 as a turning point, the export of products of heavy industries rapidly 
increased with a remarkable increase in production under the protection of the state for 
military needs. However, the increase of export was related with the increase of invest-
ment to China and Manchuria, and so it hardly improved the balance. Moreover, it 
strengthened the above-mentioned trend by reinforcing both the capital shortage of Japan 
and the dependence on raw materials (refer to Tables 2 and 3). 
The external aspect of the period of the establishment of the prewar imperialism was 
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Table 2. Prewar Balance of International Payments 









Receipts on invisible trade 
Payments on invisible trade 
Balance 
Balance of invisible trade (Balance) 
Marine transportation 
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1I1onthl)' Bulletin qt Ftnancial Stallstics (in Japanese), No. 16. 
Table 3. Investments to Ivlanchuria and the Excess of Export over Import to Manchuria 
33 
(Unit: million yen) 
, 




1932 100 73 72% 18 
33 215 137 63 135 
34 398 278 69 211 
35 580 387 66 210 
36 652 229 35 259 
Total 1,942 1,104 56 833 
The Bank of Japan, Fmanczal Histor.y after the Manchurian Incidence (in Japanese). 1948. 
Table 4. Amount or Export and Import of Gold and Silver (Unit: million yen) 
- Year i I I I 
, I I 
i 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 I 1935 I 1936 
, 1937 
--
-- - I 
-----------.-,---~ -
I 




Silver bullions and species 1 -I i 8 8 I 13 146 
i 28 -
i ! 
The decrease of outflow of gold In 1934, 1935 and 1936 IS due to the mcrease of sIlver Import owmg 
to the silver buying policy ofU_S.A. 
Monthly Bulletin of Financial Statislics (in Japanese), No.5. 
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so far explained, and then, what changes did it undergo after the war? This is our next 
subject. 
II Postwar Trade Structure 
The defeat of the World War II also brought Japan a loss of her circle of influence 
(Korea, Fonnosa, Manchuria and China), i.e., Prof. Nawa's third link. The Japanese 
capitalism, however, went successfully through the period of confusion in the new postwar 
international situation under the support ofD. S. A. Starting actually from the return or 
the incorporation of the Japanese capitalism to the international economy (or the dollar 
bloc) began with the establishment of the single exchange rate of 1949 ($1 =¥ 360)4), 
and having been helped by "The Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Act" 
(December 1949) and "The Law on Foreign Capital" (May 1950) to support a protecting 
domestic heavy industries and by the special procurements in the Korean War, the intro-
duction of technology and the initiation of the induction of foreign capital, Japan 
completed by nearly 1955 a basic course of reorganization and of resurrection as a new 
processing and trading country. Further, through the high growth period of 1955-1965, 
Japan established an industrial structure different from that of the prewar period, that is, 
heavy and chemical industrialization, by means of the so-called "liberalization of trade" 
after 1960. It was not only a pressure toward the level already attained by the western 
advanced countries but also a pursuit of the process of catching up to their new develop-
mental stage in the postwar period. Through what mechanism this transitional process 
or high accumulation process, or a new process for establishing monopolistic oligarchic 
control, was attained will not be our present subject. The subject is to see what external 
aspect functioned as a medium, or a premise for this process, and was produced as its result. 
In the following we will observe the characteristics of the postwar trade, setting the 
method of link analysis aside for a while. The entire changes in the postwar Japanese 
trade will be shown (Table 5). 
1. Decline in the Degree of Dependence upon Foreign Trade 
If compared with the prewar trade structure, the first characteristics of the postwar 
4) At the time of establishment, $1=¥360 rate was generally believed to have been a high rate in 
favor of the yen. I will not discuss here the reason why the rate was decided in favor of the yen because 
it would need a lengthy explanation. The high rate in favor of the yen, i.e., that the rate was decided 
in favor of the yen, usually functions advantageously to import (since, in general, import price express-
ed in yen becomes low). In other words, it is helpful in promoting import but in itself it does not neces~ 
sarily produce favorable terms of trade. In the case of Japan, it even tended to make terms of trade 
unfavorable. Nor was the high rate for the yen a factor which would function favorably to the working 
class. Whether an exchange rate is favorable or unfavorable to one country is not generally connec[cd 
shortly and directly in itself to the favorable or unfavorable terms of trade of the country if discussed 
separately from the definite and concrete conditions of the trade structure and the terms of transactions 
in that country. Favor or unfavor of the terms of trade do not also short-circuit to the profits of work-
ing class (real wages or the labor share). 
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Table 5. Japanese Trade 
(Unit: million dollars) 
Year Export I Perce~tage to thei 
I preVIOUS year Import 
I Percentage to the,! 
previous year I Balance 
1934-36 928 I 951 I -23 
1946 103 306 I -202 
47 174 68.9 534 74.5 -350 
48 258 48.3 684 28.1 -426 
49 510 97.7 905 32.3 -395 
50 820 60.8 967 6.9 -150 
51 1,355 65.2 1,995 106.3 -641 
52 1,273 -6.1 2,028 1.7 -755 
53 1,275 0.2 2,410 18.8 -1,135 
54 1,629 27.8 2,399 -0.4 -770 
55 2,011 23.4 2,471 3.0 -460 
56 2,501 24.4 3,230 30. 7 -729 
57 2,858 14.3 4,284 32.6 -1,426 
58 2,877 0.7 3,033 -29.2 -157 
59 3,456 20.1 3,599 18. 7 -143 
60 4,055 17.3 4,491 24.8 -437 
61 4,236 4.5 5,810 29.4 -1,575 
62 4,916 16. I 5,637 -3.0 -720 
63 5,452 10.9 6,736 19.5 -1,284 
64 6,673 22.4 7,938 17.8 -1,264 
65 8,452 26. 7 8,169 2.9 283 
66 9,776 15.7 9,523 16.6 253 
67 10,442 6.8 11,663 22.5 -1,221 
68 12,972 24.2 12,987 11.4 -15 
69 15,990 23.3 15,024 15.7 966 
70 19,318 20.8 18,881 25.7 437 
71 24,019 24.3 19,711 4.4 4,308 
Annual average for 1934-1936. For 1946, the period covers from September 1945 to December 1946. 
Based on Annual publications of The White Paper on Trade and Commerce (in Japanese). 
trade of which we are aware is a decline in the degree of dependence upon foreign trade 
(Table 6). 
"The Economic White Paper" of 1956, which initiated disputes, explained the matter 
as follows. Although the sentences are rather long, they will be quoted in the following: 
"As to import, it is directly attributed to a decrease of raw cotton import in the transition 
from natural fiber to chemical fiber, and to a saving of the import of products or semi-
products which was made possible by the self-supply of machinery, ammonium sulfate, 
pig iron, glass, pulp, etc. owing to the development of heavy and chemical industries. 
The fact that the production in metals, machinery and chemical industries is especially 
higher than that of the prewar period corresponds to the reduction in import. When we 
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Table 6. Transition of the Degree of Dependence upon Foreign Trade (Japan) 
(Unit: %) 
Year Degree of dependence Degree of dependence (A)+(B) on exports (A) on imports (B) 
1934-36 21. 0 21. 5 42.5 
52 7.8 12.4 20.2 
55 8.1 10.3 18.7 
60 9.4 10.4 19.8 
65 9.5 9.2 18. 7 
70 9.8 9.6 19.4 
Ratio of the amoWlt of exports and imports to gross national product. 
The Bank of japan, International Comparative Statistics (in japanese), 1972. The Fig~ 
ures on the prewar period are taken from the Economic Planning Agency, The Japanese 
Economy and Its Degree Q[ Dependence on Imports, Revised ed. (in Japanese). 
produce one yard of synthetic fiber from coal or carbide, the related production processes 
are by far more enlarged with greater earnings born thereof than when we produce one 
yard of cotton cloth from imported raw cotton. This increase in degree of round-about, 
namely heavy and chemical industrialization, made it possible to decrease the degree of 
dependence on imports. To accomplish the round-about of production, much invest-
ment is needed. A huge demand for investment to reconstruct the postwar economy with 
heavy and chemical industrialization as an axis increased relatively the specific gravity 
of domestic demand against demand for export, and became the principal factor for the 
decrease of degree of dependence on exports .... Thus, the production in the sectors 
of heavy and chemical industries, which rapidly increased in comparison with the prewar 
period, was absorbed in the increase of demand for investment goods that was accompanied 
with the increase of investment, and in the increase of demand for production goods that 
was caused by the round-about of production .... When the enlargement of domestic 
demand is considered from value, the increase of demand for consumption is the most 
remarkable. This is because the population increased by 30% and because earned incomes 
and farmers' incomes and so on increased comparatively. In short, the rise in the income 
level of the public owing to the labor democratization and to the agricultural land reform 
became one of the prerequisites for the decrease of the degree of dependence on exports . 
.. . As seen above, the decrease of the degree of dependence upon foreign trade was a 
comprehensive result of the movement tangled with the changes in industrial, trade and 
consumption structure. In this way, Japan became one of those countries whose degree of 
dependence upon foreign trade is the lowest in the world."') 
We will discuss this point briefly in the following. 
(!) It does not generally hold that the development of capitalism the prolongation 
of, that is to say, heavy and chemical industrialization (i.e., the round-about production) 
will lead to a decrease of the degree of dependence upon foreign trade, nor does the 
5) The Economic White Paper (in Japanese), 1956, pp. 30-33. 
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converse. In the case of Japan, the degrees of dependence on exports and on imports in 
1931 were 14% and 16% respectively, and they changed to the high degrees of de-
pendence of21 % for the annual average in 1934 through 1936. This change itself may be 
said to be a result of heavy and chemical industrialization of the Japanese economy since 
1931. This becomes evident when, in comparison with the prewar period (1937), we 
look at the changes of the degree of dependence on export in the postwar period of the 
western countries who are far more advanced in heavy industries than Japan (see Table 7). 
(2) Theoretically, the index showing the degree of dependence upon foreign trade, 
which is the ratio of trade volume to gross national product, cannot explain in itself the 
role of the foreign trade for the reproduction structure of a country. Even if the degree of 
dependence upon foreign trade is low, as in the case of the postwar Japan whose degree of 
dependence upon foreign trade dropped with a gap between the recovery of the production 
level and that of the trade level, the qualitative importance of the low degree of dependence 
upon foreign trade can be also said in practice to be rather high in the sense that the 
production in an enlarged scale, that is, the round-about of production itself, is supported 
by it, when the low level of trade forms an essential condition for the entire reproduction-
of which Japan is a good example. 
(3) The rate of increase in volumes of the world trade during the decade after the 
World War II was larger than that during the decade after the World War 1. Namely, 
in 1928 the rate of increase was 30% or so which is the level of 1913, on the other hand, 
while in the postwar period it reached to the level of the prewar period (the level of 1937) 
as early as in 1948, and in 1954 it exceeded 50% which was the level of 1937. Whereas, 
in the case of Japan, the production index of mineral and manufacturing industries and 
real incomes increased over the prewar level (the averages of 1934-1936) in 1951, but the 
volume of export did not exceed the prewar level until 1959 (in 1954, it was one half of the 
prewar level). The increase of the volume of trade (export) of Japan was at a rate of 
17.3% for the annual average of 1950-1959 and 16.5% for the annual average of 1960-
1969, which is more than about twice as much as the rate of increase in the world trade for 
the same period, i.e., 7.6% and 8.2%. This is because the drop after the war was very 
Table 7. Transition of the Degree of Dependence on Exports of Several Countries (current price base) 
(Unit: 'Yo) 
1937 1955 1960 1965 1970 
U.S.A. 3. 7 3.9 4.0 4.0 4.4 
Great Britain 10.4 14.9 14.2 13.2 16.0 
Germany 12.2 14.2 15.9 15.8 18.3 
France 5.4 10.0 11. 4 10. 7 12.0 
Italy 6. I 7.7 10.4 12.4 14.2 
The Nertherlands 20.5 33. 7 35.B 33.4 37.7 
The Bank of Japan, International Comparative Statistics (in Japanese). The figures on the prewar period 
are taken from IMF, International Financial Statisi£cs. 
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much higher in Japan than in the western countries and it was not indeed until 1969 that 
Japan recovered the share of the prewar period in the world trade (5.4% in 1938, the 
fourth in the world; Table 8). 
The biggest factor in such a lag of recovery of export (which at the same time limits 
the capacity of import of Japan) was due to that Japan had been cut off from the North-
eastern Asian market (the so-called neighboring market, above all the Chinese market) 
which was the most convenient geographically. The loss of the previledged colonial 
markets was one of the above example. This is also because Japan was placed as a wing 
in the system of dominance of U. S. A. over Asia or of militaristic anti-communism in the 
midst of the formation of socialism in China and the intensification of tension in Asia, and 
because Japan yielded to this policy (the policy of blockade against China which was 
forced to Japan and which Japan followed). At the same time, there was the situation 
that until the middle of 1950's, what could be the major Japanese export goods and 
therefore had the competitive power in export was the traditional products of light in-
dustries with the textile products as a principal, which have tending toward a global 
decline of demand. And this situation mentioned above may be reckoned as one of the 
factors for the low level of export. This factor also explains the fact that the overheat of 
economy was immediately connected to an increase of import, and obliged to invite a crisis 
in the international balance of payments. 
(4) Furthermore, in addition to such a low level of income from export, Japan placed 
under a strict control by the Foreign Exchange Control Act all the foreign capitals 
including income from special procurements (which accounted for two-third of the volume 
of export in 1952-1953 and weighted 25% in 1955 too). This made it possible to secure 
raw materials and to defend the domestic market for heavy and chemical industries which 
remained still weak. In short, it transformed heavy and chemical industries into the 
future industries for export by securing the domestic market for these industries through 
Table 8. Shares by the Major Countries in the Exports of the World (excluding socialist bloc) 
(Unit: %) 
Japan U.S.A. Great Britain! West Germany I 
. , 
France Italy 
1955 2.4 18.3 9.6 7.7 6.0 2.2 
60 3.6 18. I 9.0 10.1 6. 1 3.2 
65 5. 1 16.5 8.0 10.9 6.1 4.4 
70 6.9 15.3 7.0 12.3 6.4 4. 7 
De,;,eloped countries Developin~t countries 
Western Europe I ! Central and 
.. 
EEC ! Asia : South America 
1955 71. 9 41. 5 22.4 28.1 8.1 9.4 
60 75.8 45.6 26.3 24.2 6.8 7.6 
65 77.9 47.7 29. 1 22. 1 5.7 6. 7 
70 80.5 i 49.2 31. 8 19.5 5. 1 5.2 
The Bank of]apan, International Comparatwe Statistics (in Japanese). 
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controlling foreign capital and by accomplishing intensive accumulation. This process 
existed together with the postwar gross national product, namely, the abnormally high 
postwar rate of fixed capital formation (both private and governmental) in the total 
expenditure (the annual average for the prewar 1934-1936 being 14.3%, 22% for the 
~postwar 1953, 26.7% for 1958, and 33.4% for 1964). On the other hand, the process 
coexisted with a relative decline in the private consumption expenditure (the annual 
average for the prewar 1934-1936 being 65%, 61.5% for the postwar 1953, 62.1 % for 
1958, and 52.2% for 1964) and also with the low labor share of manufacturing industries 
(the annual average for the prewar 1934-1936 being 31 %, 38% for the postwar 1955, 
and 32% for 1969) which had remained low without much difference when compared 
with the share in the prewar period. Rather, all these became essential conditions for 
molding the process. 
Therefore, the fundamental cause for the decrease of the degree of dependence upon 
foreign trade is not the higher income level nor the change of consumption structure 
owing to the democratization of labor and the agricultural land reform, as is explained in 
"The Economic White Paper". It can be mentioned that these factors rather tended to 
deteriorate relatively. Therefore, it can never be simply generalized as a mere result of 
heavy and chemical industrialization (round-about of production). The uneven develop-
ment among the various sectors the structure of intensive accumulation, i.e., the heavy 
and chemical industrialization were artificially enforced by dint of the control over foreign 
capital (which still remains in different forms of residual import restriction and non-tariff 
barrier as liberalization of trade proceed) under the historical conditions to which the 
Japanese capitalism had been subject after the war. The very matter mentioned above 
is, preferably, the biggest factor which led to decreasing quantitatively the degree of 
dependence on exports and imports, with the other systems of accumulation of the state 
monopolistic capitalism (for example, tax system, selective supply of funds, i.e., the con-
centrated loan system, over-loan, etc.). 
(5) Since 1965 Japanese economy is said to have become an export-leading 
economy. In fact the degree of dependence of mineral and manufacturing industrial 
production upon exports in Japan increased greatly thereafter from 14% in 1960 to 18% 
in 1968. Especially in the export-leading industries which were the carrier of the high 
growth (the best fifty companies in export in 1969), the degree of dependence on ex-
ports has kept a high level of20% since 1965. 
The actual increase of the degree of dependence on exports of production of mineral 
and manufacturing industries, above all of heavy and chemical industries which are the 
basis of reproduction of a country, is resulting in an increase of the export ratio in gross 
national product (the so-called degree of dependence on exports) both in a nominal 
value and a real value (refer to The White Paper on Trade and Commerce [in Japanese], 1970, 
p.l05). Such a trend, combined with the development and the pressure of the open 
system, will further advance the internationalization of the Japanese economy in future. 
It seems that this will also result in an increase of the degree of dependence on exports 
and on imports both in quantity and in quality. 
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2. Changes in the Structure of Trade Conunodities 
(I) It is after the Korean War, i.e., 1953, that a new trend is said to have appeared 
in the structure of export commodities. As is seen in Table 9, textile products took the 
first place accounting for 40% of the total export in also 1955 as well as in the prewar 
period. Miscellaneous goods classified as "others" in the Table (for example, toys) 
weighted high and the traditional trade structure with the products of light industries as 
an axis was maintained as a whole. Although iron and steel, ships and chemical fertilizers 
appeared already as main export goods, they hardly indicated a pattern of a new develop-
ment of the postwar trade, since they had already attained a certain level of development 
as munitions-related industries in the prewar period (Tables 9 and 10). 
(2) As seen above, the feature of the postwar world trade is found in its growth rate 
which was higher than that after the World War I. In addition, trade of industrial 
products and trade among industrial countries tended to be enlarged. Especially, the 
growth in the trade of products of heavy and chemical industries among industrial 
countries was remarkable. This chiefly characterizes the postwar world trade, while the 
main axis in the enlargement of the prewar (1913-1938) world trade was an exchange 
between industrial products of industrial countries and primary products of non-industrial 
countries, which was, in other words, an enlargement of the vertical specialization. 
In consequence, the share of underdeveloped countries which produce mainly primary 
products constantly declined in the world trade, and their share in the world export 
eventually fall below 20% in 1965. Even in the supply of primary products excepting 
petroleum, supply by the developed countries (especially, export of foodstuffs from 
U. S. A. in connection with aids) grew higher. 
The enlargement and the development of Japanese export in the postwar period can 
be said to have been a self-adjustment to such a trend of the world trade. 
(3) As to the private plant and equipment investment, an emphasis was placed until 
about 1955 on the expansion of productive capacity of such key industries as electricity, 
coal, iron and steel, fertilizer, and shipping. As well as the investment for rationalization 
of existing industries, new industries and new techniques were introduced in preparation 
for the future development. Then, the monetary restraint due to the crisis of foreign 
exchange in the fall of 1953 brought a stagnation in 1954, and after 1955 a storm of invest-
ment for modernization was rapidly pushed forward under the historic economic prosperity 
(the so-called "Jinmu" boom). It was a full-scale introduction of new technological 
innovation, and it led the new industrial techniques prepared in the previous period to 
come into flower. At the same time it brought changes in the structural relations among 
industries. After a slight stagnation from the latter half of 1957 to the first half of 1958, 
due to the crisis of foreign exchange and the monetary restraint, investment for moderniza-
tion and rationalization intensified further under another historic economic prosperity 
(the so-called "Iwato" boom). Besides, urgent need ofIiberalization of trade originating 
in the dollar crisis in 1958 inevitably strengthened to accelerating such a situation. Thus, 
heavy and chemical industries which accounted for 48% of the manufacturing industries 
.. 
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Table 9. Export Structure in Kinds of Commodities 
(Unit: %) 





11934-361 1950 1953 1955 1960 I 1965 1970 1971 i i ! I , 
100.0 1 100.0 I 100.0 ! 100.0 I I I Total 100.0 i 100.0 
I 
100.0 100.0 
(35.7)1 i Products of heavy and (19.6)1 (30.4)! (36.2)1 (41. 4): (62.0)1 (72.4) (74.8) chemical industries 
I Machinery 7. I 10.0 14.9 12.3 I 22.9 35.2 46.3 I 49.4 
Metals and products 8 2 I 18.5 IS. I 19.2 14.0 20.3 19.7 I 19.0 I . , I 
Chemicals 4.3 i 1.9 5.7 I 4.7 4.5 6.5 I 6.4 " 6.2 
Products of light industries I (64.3)1 
i I (80.4)1 (69.6)1 (63.8) (58.6), (38.0)' (28.6)' (25.2) and others 
, 





Textiles 52. I 48.6 36.1 1 37.3 I 30.2 18. 7 12.6 i II. 5 , 
1.91 Non-metalic mineral 3.0 3. 7 I 4.9 4.2 4.1 3.1 I 1.6 product'i 1 I 
I II. 0 1 
I I Others 15.8 14.0 1 15.5 , 18.0 i 12. I I 9.7 I 9.3 
I 
Based on annual publications of The White Paper on Trade and Commerce (in japanese). 
Table 10. Japanese Major Export Commodities 
(Unit: million dollars) 
I I 
, 
Order i 1936-38 I 1950 I 1955 I 
1 
I 
I Cotton fabrics 182 Cotton fabrics 207 i Cotton fabrics 252 
Raw silk 123 Iron and steel I 167 2 72 I Iron and steel 
3 Fishes and shellfishes 83 Artificial silk fabrics 38 Fishes and sheIlfishes 74 
4 Artificial silk fabrics 48 Copper 36 Clothing 56 
5 Iron and steel 43 Clothing 30 Staple fiber fabrics 53 
6 Silk fabrics 25 Ship 26 Ship 52 
7 vVoolen fabrics 17 : Silk fabrics 22 Artificial silk fabrics 50 
8 Ceramics 14 I Toys 12 Chemical fertilizer 37 
9 , Cotton yarn 12 I Staple fiber fabrics II Ceramics 35 




Order 1960 I 1965 I 1971 I 
. 
! I Iron and steel I Iron and steel 388 I Iron and steel 1,290 3,542 
2 Cotton fabrics 352 ! Ship 713 I Automobiles 2,373 
3 , Ship 288 I Cotton fa brics 303 ! Ship 1,849 
I 
4 Clothing 218 i Clothing 2871 Metal products 823 
5 Radio receivers 145 ' Automobiles 237 , Radio receivers 791 
6 Staple fiber fabrics 118 1 Fishes and shelIfishes 231 I Synthetic fiber 751 
7 Automobiles 961 Radio receivers 216
1 
Motorcycles 612 
8 ' Toys 90 Synthetic fiber 186
1 
Optical instrument 574 
9 I Footwares 73 I Optical instrument 179 Television sets 499 
!O 1 Ceramics 98 I Taperecorders 490 I 68 I Toys 
I 
For 1965 and the prevIOUS years, MInistry of InternatIOnal Trade and Industry, Twen~y Years qfthe 
Postwar Japanese Trade (in Japanese), and for 1971, Monthly Bulletin of Financial Statistics (in Japanese), 
No. 251. 
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in 1955 had increased by 1960 their share to 59%, which was nearly as high as the inter-
national level. The entirely new industrial fields like electronics industry, synthetic 
chemical industry and petrochemical industry and so on were developed mainly depending 
on the introduction of foreign technology, and besides, steel, electric, machinery and 
automobile industries also developed remarkably as the so-called growing industries'). 
(4) With this trend as a background, new export commodities were created one after 
another since 1955 and the diversification of export commodities was promoted. 
In such new trend, the ratio of heavy and chemical industrial products vs. light 
industrial products in export was reversed lastly in 1963. However, heavy and chemical 
industrial products at this stage were ships, steel (products as materials) and light 
machinery and equipment (transistor radios, cameras, sewing machines, etc.) and, as 
to the machinery, the ratio of the· capital-intensive equipment, heavy machinery, or of the 
capital-intensive production goods was remarkably low except for ships, in comparison 
with the other western countries. Such light machinery is a labor-intensive product 
which makes use of small businesses and household industry, and ships used to need com-
paratively much labor. The export of machinery of japan was concentrated on and 
specialized in such a few number of items of commodities with ships as a main stay, which 
also was a unique characteristic compared with the western advanced countries. More-
over, in case of japan, a difference from the western countries was also found in the fact 
that the ratio of export of heavy and chemical industrial products to underdeveloped 
countries was large. Furthermore, the export of heavy and chemical industrial products 
toward underdeveloped countries was mainly supported by deferred payments in export 
and by loans with national funds. The total volume of the japanese export increased 
by approximately 2.4 times from 4.05 billion dollars in 1960 to 9.77 billion dollars in 1966, 
during which period export of plants (ships, textile machinery, industrial machinery, 
railway vehicles, automobiles, iron and steel structures, etc.) increased by four times and 
export on deferred payments by 4.7 times. Also the main portion of export on deferred 
payments and loans supported by the national funds was oriented toward underdeveloped 
countries. This coincides with the fact that the ratio of the japanese export of plants 
toward underdeveloped countries is higher than that of the western countries. At the 
same time, it helped the advancement of the hitherto relatively inferior export structure, 
or heavy and chemical industrialization of japan, by contributing to the enlargement of 
the japanese export of machinery. 
(5) Due to an increase in scattering dollars along with the beginning of bombing 
in North Vietnam in 1965 or the intensification of the Vietnam War (readers may also 
recall that the year had a political change of Indonesian Government, in which Sukarno 
fell from power and the birth of the treaty between japan and the Republic of Korea), 
japan had recovered from the most serious crisis in the postwar period from the end of 1964 
6) As to the pattern of the introduction of foreign capital and of technology, refer in detail to, Ono, K., 
"Liberalization and the Problems of Foreign Capital", in Matui, K., ed., Liberalization oj Trade and Ex-
change (in]apanese), 1960. 
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to 1965, and whereafter her export increased drastically except in 1967 of the global 
recession. The export structure was also overwhelmingly went through heavy and 
chemical industrialization and also the weight in the structure of exports toward developed 
countries came to be reversed from the light industrial products to the heavy and chemical 
industrial products. In short, a gap between the industrial structure and the export 
structure was dissolved (see Tables II and 12). 
The problems of the export structure in the present stage will be discussed later and 
here we will simply confirm the changes in it. 
Textile products which accounted for 19% of the total volume of export in 1965 de-
clined to II % in 1971 and cotton products and clothing ceased finally to remain among 
the best ten items in export. The export of machinery increased from 35% to 49%, 
among which especially automobiles increased rapidly from 2.8% to 10% taking the 
second place in export (see Table 10). The ratio of heavy and chemical industrial 
products in export increased from 62% to 74.6% and led to exceed by far the rate of heavy 
industrialization creating a reverse gap. Here, the export structure, which was reversed 
in that of the prewar period and was different both in quality and in quantity, came into 
existence. 
(6) The changes in the industrial structure and the export structure necessarily 
brought about the changes in the import structure. As is seen in Tables 13 and 14-A, 
a decline in the import of textile materials is outstanding. Textile materials which 
Table 11. Trend of Industrialization of Developed Countries 
(Unit: %) 
1955 1960 I 1965 , 1970 
_._-_._--, _._------------_. 
U.S.A. 30.1 28.4 28. 7 26.2 
Ratio of yVest Germany 40.8 41.2 , 41.0 40.7 
industrialization Great Britain 36. 7 63.3 35.0 34.5 
japan 27.8 34.2 32.6 36.0 
Ratio of heavy and U.S.A. 52.8 51. 2 I 54. 7 57.8 
chemical industrialization "Vest Germany 57.5 58.6 ! 58. 1 59.4 
of industries 
Great Britain 55.6 58.3 57.5 57.0 
I 






Ratio of heavy and U.S.A. 51. 2 51. 8 54.6 62. 1 
chemical industrialization "Vest Germany 66.7 75.5 
I 
75.1 74.5 
of export Great Britain I 57.7 
, 66.6 65.2 65.5 
japan , 
I 
37.8 44.0 62.0 72.4 
Ratto or mdustrlallzahon=productlon of manufacturmg industries/GNP. 
Ratio of heavy and chemical industrialization of industries = production of value added in heavy and 
chemical industries/production of value added in industries. . 
Ratio of heavy and chemical industrialization of export=amount of export of products of heavy and 
chemical industrje~/amount of expor1. 
The White Paper on Trade and Commerce (in Japanese)! 1972. 
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Table 12. Change in the Export Structure 
(Unit: %) 
I 
DeveJoped countries ! Developing countries I Socialist World 
IUS A -I Southeast i bloc , 
... i Asia I 
, 
I 
I 1955 100.0 45.0 22.3 53.5 37.0 1.4 , 60 100.0 47.4 27.2 50. 7 32.2 I 1.8 Total export 
I 65 i 100.0 50.9 29.3 43.4 26.0 5. 7 
70 100.0 54.0 
, 




1955 100.0 I, 25.8 I 8.7 70.5 43.2 , 1.7 
I 
, 
I Products of heavy and : 60 100.0 I 31. 4 I 19.6 65.8 38.2 2.8 I 
chemical industries ! 65 100.0 I 46.7 I 27. 1 
, 
48.0 27.1 , 5.3 
70 100.0 , 54.5 i 30.7 I 39.5 23.3 6.0 
, , 
Ratio of heavy and 1955 I 37.8 
, 




I chemical industrial- I 60 i 44.0 29. 1 31. 8 I 57.1 56.3 68.0 
ization of export of ! 65 62.0 56. 7 55.5 i 68.3 , 65.3 61. 0 
each regions 1 70 I 72.4 ! 73.0 
, 
72.4 I 70.5 I 66.4 80.0 
Products of heavy and chemical mdustnes represent Items under SITe (Standard InternatIOnal Trade 
Classification) 5, 67-69, 7, 861, 864 and 891-1. Ratio of heavy and chemical industrialization of 
export for Southeast Asia in 1965 is considered a typographical error, and was replaced by the figure in 
The White Paper on Tmde and Commerce: The Itemized Discussion (in Japanese). 
The White Paper on Trade and Commerce (in Japanese). 1972. 
Table 13. Percentage of Import Structure in Kinds of Commodities. 
(Unit: %) 
1934-36 i 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1971 
(Total) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 , 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Foodstuffs 16.5 31. 9 " 25.4 12.2 18.0 13.6 14.8 
Textile materials 31. 8 37.9 24.2 17.0 10.4 5.1 4.9 
Metal materials 3.5 1.9 7.5 15.0 12.5 14.3 12.8 
Others matel'ials 6.0 14.8 17.8 17.2 16.6 16.0 14.8 
Mineral fuels 4.9 5.5 11. 6 16.5 19.9 20. 7 24. 1 
Chemical products 4.1 4. 1 3.2 5.9 5.0 5.3 5. 1 
Machinery and instrument 4. 7 0.8 5.5 9.0 9.8 12.2 12.2 
Other processed goods 28.5 3. 1 4.8 7.2 8.2 12.3 10. 7 
Other materials include rawhide, soybeans, natural rubber, timber, tallow, etc, a her processed goods 
include iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, textiles, etc. 
Based on annual publications of The White Paper on Trade and Commerce (in Japanese). 
-
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Table 14-A. Trend of Major Imported Commodities 
(Unit· 'Yo) 
2 3 4 6 
IPercentage of the 
isix commodities 
i, ' 
I in the total 
i import 
66% 1950 i Ra(29)tton; ~f~)t I ~~f -I~iir-I-p-e-tr(~)um I Raw(~bber: 
-;955 I, Raw cott-o·n-~I'-p-e-t-ro-I-eu-m--ci --R-ice ,I Wheat '-+--W--o-o-I-I Sugar "--'-1--'-- --
!, (16) (9) i (8) i (7) (7) (5) 52 
1960 I! Crude oil i Raw cotton ---Vl-'o-o-I--iI'-Ir-o-n-s-cr-a-p--'--I-ro-n-o-re-'I-w-h-e-a-t -'-I --40------
(10) ! (10) I (6) I (5) (5) (4) i 
I-~------~------------~I ------,------+~c===+_-------, 
, Crude oil Iron ore Timber Raw cotton Wool I Non-ferrous I 
1965 i (13) (6) (6) I (5) I (4) metals 38 
I ___ ~' -----~'----~--~,"-o- I , __ ~0~)_-+' ______ _ 
1970 
:,:' Crude oil Timber Iron Ofe I Non-ferrl'-OUS--C~o~--TNon-ferrlous II 
, 
(12) (8) (6) I meta s (5)! meta s 
I (6) (5) 
Customs StatIstICS, taken from Monthl] Bulletm of Fznancwl Statzstlcs (m Japanese), No. 240. 
Table 14-B. Ratio of Import of Raw Materials in Advanced Industrialized 
Countries (1969) 
Japan U.S.A. I Great Britain ,",Vest Germany I EEC 
61. 4 21. I 31. 6 29.6 31. 7 
Ibid. 
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Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Pros pee cif Resource Problems (mjapanese), 
1971. For 1975, estimated values are used, 
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weighted 40% still in 1950 decreased to just 5% in 1970. This explains both the decline 
of textile products in export and the conversion of the textile industry into the synthetic 
fiber industry along with a decline in the importance of natural fiber materials like cotton 
and wool and so on. On the other hand, an increase in the weight of mineral fuels and 
crude oil is contrasting. This reflects the followings: the development of petrochemical 
industries; ,the change of energy policies originating in the fall of heavy oil price due to 
the Suez Upheaval in 1957; the decisive importance of heavy oil import replacing coal in 
energy industry along with the transition from the policy of "water-power generation over 
thermal-power generation" to that of "thermal-power generation over water-power 
generation" (the dominance of international petroleum capital in energy industry and 
at the same time the increase of import of the Middle East petroleum); the switch-over 
from the ammonium sulfate industry which was once the coal chemical industry to petro-
chemical industry; the initiation of heavy oil blowing in blast furnaces in the iron and 
steel industry; and the expansion of demand because of the spread of automobiles. The 
subordinance to the international petroleum capital also meant the strengthening and the 
enlargement (rationalization) of the competitive power of industries for export through 
the transition in energy industry from coal to petroleum, i.e., a reduction of cost. 
In this way, the weight of organic materials (textile materials plus animals and plant 
materials, especially agricultural materials) which accounted for still more 30% in 1960 
declined to 19% in 1971 and the import of mineral industrial materials weighted over-
whelmingly. When compared with the fact that in the prewar period the structure of 
imported commodities had a form which suited the demand of the one-time industrial 
structure with the cotton industry as a main stay, it is quite evident that the structure of 
imported commodities has come to possess a new form which suited the demand of the 
heavy and chemical industries. 
The ratio of foodstuff import in the total volume of imports does not show much 
difference in spite of a decline in the ratio of food self-supply (80% in 1960 and 52% in 
1971 on the calory base), but its content changed greatly. That is to say, the prewar 
foodstuff import mainly consisted of the import of rice from the colonies (Korea, Formosa), 
while in the present the weight of wheat, corn and kaoliang for liverstock feed, and meat 
and so on is overwhelming, which is worth noting. The characteristics are shown in the 
followings: the ratio of raw materials and mineral fuels is quite higher than in the western 
countries. Although the import of machinery is increasing, the import of light industrial 
products is relatively low. In' that sense, it may be said that the structure of vertical 
specialization exceeding the level of the prewar period is being maintained, which is 
different from the trend oftrade of advanced industrial countries. 
Although the matter mentioned above may be a consequence of defending domestic 
markets by mobilizing the residual import restriction and non-tariff barrier and so on, it 
can hardly be denied that it helps the trade structure of Japan to become a very selective 
or exclusive structure for industrial products. We will discuss this problem again later. 
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3. Changes in the Market Structure 
First of ali, the postwar market structure is roughly explained in Tables 15 and 16. 
(1) From these statistical data, we can see that in the postwar period the market 
structure of Japan mainly consists of North American and Southeastern Asian markets. 
It may be gathered from them that when compared with the prewar period, however, 
the ratio of Asian markets declined, while the ratio of American markets increased in 
export. 













I , Total 100.0 100.0 , 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
i 
I Asia (excluding socialist bloc) 51. 3 I 41. 9 , 35. 7 29.4 28.2 27.0 
, I Southeast Asia 47.9 37.6 , 32.2 26.0 25.4 24.0 
Western Asia 3.4 4.3 3.5 3.4 2.8 3.0 
Western Europe 9.3 10.2 
, 
II. 7 12.8 15.0 14. 1 
EC - - 4.3 5. 7 6. 7 6.8 
EFTA - - 5.6 5.4 5.5 5.4 
North America 19.0 , 24.6 30. 1 31. 9 33.7 34.9 




(22.6) (27.2) (29.3) (30. 7) (31. 2) 
La tin America 8.6 9.3 7.5 5.8 6. 1 6.6 
, 
I Africa 10. I 
I 
10.2 8. 7 9. 7 7.4 8.6 
Oceania 1.8 I 3.8 4.5 4.8 4.2 4.0 










100.0 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 , 100.0 
Asia (excluding socialist bloc) 33. 1 36.6 29.8 30.3 28.0 32.3 
, 
Southeast Asia 27.6 30.2 20.4 ! 17.2 16.0 17.3 
Western Asia 5.5 6.4 9.4 I 13. 1 12.0 15.0 
Western Europe I 8.3 7.1 8.8 , 8.9 10.2 10.4 , 
EC ! - - 4. 7 i 4.8 5.9 5.8 
, 
EFTA - - 3.5 3. 7 4.0 4.1 
North America 36.8 35. 7 39. 1 33.3 I 34.4 30.3 
(U. S. A.) (31.4) (31. 2) (34.6) (29.0) (29.4) (25.3) 
Latin America 11. 0 9.8 6.9 8.7 , 7.3 6.8 
Africa 2.3 2.5 3.6 4.3 I 5.8 5.0 
Oceania 
, 
B.4 B.3 9.0 B.O I 9.8 10.4 
I 
I 
Socialist bJoc - - 2.8 6.5 , 4. 7 4.8 , 
, I 
Southeast ASIa mcludes Northeast ASIa. RapId mcrease of Import of Western ASIa indicates an 
increase of mideastern petroleum import. 
Based on annual publications of The White Paper on Trade and Commerce (in Japanese). 
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(Reference Table) 
Market Structure in Regions in the Prewar Period (1934-1976) 
Export Import 
Asia 64 53 
Neighboring countries 43 37 
(Mainland China) (I 3) (10) 
Southeast Asia 18 16 
Europe 8 10 
North America 17 25 
(U. S. A.) (16) (24) 
Latin America 2 2 
Africa 6 3 
Oceania 3 7 
The figures include trade within a country. Neighboring countries 
include Formosa, Korea and Mainland China. 
The Economic Whit, Paper (in Japanese). 1964. 
The degree of concentration of the best ten countries was higher in the prewar period 
(87%) than in the postwar period (60% or so) (Table 16). This explains the fact that the 
prewar Asian-centered markets (especially those of neighboring countries) had to spread 
territorially because of the postwar loss of and the cut-off from the neighboring markets 
and because of the enlargement of production scale under these conditions and that the 
possibility to that effect had been given. 
(2) In connection with that is seen above, the prewar market structure of Japan 
tended overwhelmingly to be with underdeveloped countries (trade with Asia), while in 
the postwar period the weight of the trade with developed countries increased along with 
the changes in the industrial structure and in the structure of trade commodities, which 
is mentioned above. The main portion of the export markets of Japan was Southeastern 
Asian-centered underdeveloped countries even in the latter half of 1950's, but since 1965 
the weight of the trade with developed countries has exceeded the weight of the trade with 
underdeveloped countries. In the western countries 70%-80% of the trade is with 
developed countries, while in Japan the weight of developed countries in trade is relatively 
low. However, the weight of underdeveloped countries, which was 70% in 1951, declined 
to 54% in 1955,51 % in 1960, 44% in 1965 and 41 % in 1970. On the other hand, the 
weight of developed countries gradually increased from 26% in 1951 to 51 % in 1965 
exceeding the half, and to 54% in 1970, which is worth noting. 
4. The Postwar Trade Structure 
We have so far surveyed the postwar changes in the market structure, and now we will 
examine the problem of the postwar trade structure together with that of the changes in 
the commodities structure in relation to the prewar link thesis. 
(I) Prof. Kiyoshi Matsui, who tried to schematize the postwar trade structure on the 
basis of the period from the year of the defeat in the war to 1952 (the period of recovery 
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Table 16. Ten Major Countries in Japanese Export 
(Unit: million doHars) 
Year i 1934-36 1 _____ 9_5_°,-__ ',_____ _95_5 ____ 
1 
----J Country ,I Amount I Country !Amount
i
! Country iAmount Order 
-------- ------=LI-T-.. -.-I'I-,.-~-"-I3-li-<-'-I--18··-5-L, __ · ____ .....l,I __ 183 I' 
I , ..... Korea U. S. A. 
2 I China '169 Pakis tan 56 I 
3 U. S. A. ,147 Hong Kong i 53 
4 Burma and 88 
India 
5 Formosa 74 








































9 I India 
10 I Formosa 
Percentage of the ten countries
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in the total amount of export, 
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20 Great Britain 
19 Australia 
16 I Argentine 








144 ,Hong Kong 
121 China 
26 Great Britain 
23 ! Singapore 
















The Republic i 







































For 1965 and the previous years, Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Twenf)l Year..\' cif Postwar 
Japanese Trade (in japanese) , and for 1971, ThB T4'hill! Paper on Trade and Commerce (in Japanese). 
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of the production level to the prewar level), explains as follows: 
Thefirstlink: Trade with U.S.A. Colonial or subordinate type. Itisplainly 
demonstrated in import by the name of aids and in export by the name of special 
procurements. As to the commodities structure, because of the rapid decrease 
in the export of raw silk, aids and income from special procurements were the 
starter and with that dollar raw cotton, foods, coal, iron ore and petroleum 
and so on were imported. In the balance of trade, imports overwhelmingly 
excessed exports. 
The second link: Trade with Southeast Asia. Subordinate and imperialistic 
type. By "substitute exporting" of U. S. A., Japan competed with Great 
Britain. As to the commodities structure, textile products, machinery, and 
metal products were exported, while foods and materials for industries were 
imported. 
The third link: Trade with China. This is a trade with the socialist bloc and is 
quite a new type. Presently it is under the prohibiting restriction because of 
the war policy of U. S. A. As to the commodities structure in the year of 1960 
when the trade with China was to some degree undertaken, metal products 
and machinery were exported and coal, iron ore and soy beans were imported'). 
Furthermore, Prof. Matsui analyzed the mutual relation among these links as 
follow: "Mter the war the export toward Southeast Asia rapidly increased, ... The biggest 
cause, of course, is a cut-off from the Chinese markets, and so Southeast Asia had to be 
looked on as a new market replacing the loss of the Chinese markets. Especially an in-
crease in export is remarkable and the export toward Southeast Asian markets has con-
tinued to excess over the import since the prewar period. As well as in the prewar period, 
excess of import over export in the trade with U. S. A. was complemented in the postwar 
period by the excess of export over import in the trade with Southeast Asia. There were 
the differences in that the prewar trade with Southeast Asia was an independent invasion 
of the Japanese imperialism, but the postwar trade became a subcontract trade and is 
incorporated in the mechanism of the American domination over Asia .... In other words, 
purchasing power of the dollar which was scattered by U. S. A. supported the Japanese 
trade with Southeast Asia."') 
Criticizing this schematization or the presentation of a new three-link thesis for the 
postwar period by Prof. Matsui, Prof. Masaharu Yoshimura remarked as in the following: 
"If we classify the postwar Japanese trade into several groups, it should be grouped into 
two; subordinate, militaristic trade and independent, equal, peaceful trade; trade with 
capitalist bloc and trade with socialist bloc." "Although the difference in nature between 
trade with U. S. A. and that with Southeast Asia should not be totally ignored, it should 
only be ofa secondary importance."') 
7) Matsui, K., Japanese Trade (in]apanese), 1954, p. 42. 
8) Ibid., pp. 136-38. 
9) Yoshimura, M., Japanese Trade Policy (in Japanese), 1951, pp. 104-05. 
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(2) Based on the subsequent changes or the reality of the period of 1959-1960, Prof. 
Matsui presented again a "link thesis on the Japanese trade" in accordance with the new 
postwar stage. Here, he used the term "route" instead of the heretofore term "link". 
The first route: Trade with U. S. A. and the Organization for European 
Economic Cooperation. For Japan this trade is of an underdeveloped country; 
mainly labor-intensive commodities are exported and capital-intensive commod-
ities are imported. This is because, though Japan is an advanced industrial 
country herself, the level of her productive capacity is a little inferior to that of 
the western countries. It may well be called "a middle-developed country". 
The second route: Trade with Asia, Africa and Central and South America. 
The trade may well be called to be of potentially imperialistic type. Most of 
the Southeast Asian countries which are specially closely related to Japan, for 
example, are politically independent after the war but belong to economically 
underdeveloped still now. Capital-intensive commodities are exported from 
from Japan and foods and raw materials are imported. Such a trade structure 
tends to involve an imperialistic invasion. 
The third route: Trade with the socialist bloc. Especially in the postwar 
period its importance has increased. The trade is with socialist countries like 
China and U. S. S. R. and so on. As a matter of fact, it may be called of 
reciprocal and equal type. As to the trade structure, for the time being heavy 
and chemical industrial products (materials for construction) are exported from 
Japan and raw materials and food are imported. Changes will be expected 
as the construction of socialism proceeds'O). 
3) The three-link thesis which is based on the period of inversion to the high growth 
since 1965 or to the general trend of the black-ink in the international balance of payments 
is summarized and schematized by Mr. Nobuyoshi Nakagawa. 
Thefirst link: Trade with U. S. A. and Europe. Competitive for dividing 
markets type .... An invasion of the Japanese capital is placed under severe 
surroundings because of such factors as the intensified competition with American 
capital over both of these markets, inclination toward a protective trade in 
U. S. A., import restrictions toward Japan by West European countries and so 
on. 
The second link: Trade with Asia, Africa and Latin America. Subordinate, 
imperialistic type. As to the trade with Asia, among the Asian countries, 
the Republic of Korea, Formosa and Hong Kong stand a higher rank next to 
U. S. A. in the volume of export from Japan. Export largely exceeds import 
and the trade tends to be of one sided. I t is also closely connected to the coun-
tries related to "Vietnam War" like Thailand and Philippines. 
It also includes trade with Oceania, though it is of a little different nature. 
10) Matsui, K., Introduction to Japanese Trade (in Japanese) , 1962, pp. 86-87. 
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Import largely exceeds export and the trade is of one-sided, which is in reverse 
from the trade with Asia. 
The third rink: Trade with the socialist bloc. "Reciprocal and equal type." 
The trade with the socialist bloc will develop in the extent and the depth of the 
market and will increase its importance"). 
Needless to say, the postwar trade, which is related or connected with the reproduction 
of Japanese economy that is ten times as much in the production level compared with the 
prewar period, which constitutes the fundamental conditions for this reproduction, and 
which is five times as much in the substantial level of volume, is naturally different in 
qualitative and quantitative scales from the prewar trade which consisted mainly of light 
industries and was supported by raw silk and cotton products. And also the postwar 
trade is of more multilateral characters. If everything is included (the inclusiveness or 
the spread of markets is, however, in itself based on the dissolution of the old imperialistic 
bloc, i.e., a change of the conditions of the postwar world markets given by U. S. A.), we 
do not necessarily need to use the term "link". An ordinary grasp on "the duplicity or 
multilateral character of the Japanese trade markets", or an analysis under respective 
markets will suffice for it. At least it seems that they do not mean the successiveness or 
steps same as the links in the link thesis of Prof. N awa. 
(4) However, the process of the enlargement of the Japanese capitalism in the post-
war period or the reorganization into heavy and chemical industrialization, i.e., the change 
and the enlargement of reproduction conditions (which in itself classifies the link thesis 
as seen previously according to the differences in the characteristics of the markets, but 
alters and enlarges it into a comprehensive form, and intercepts the meaning of the link 
thesis or its continuity) principally depended on the postwar Japan~U. S. A. relations 
(both political and economic). Heavy and chemical industrialization of Japan itself 
always depended on the trade between Japan and U. S. A. (including aids and special 
procurements) and was carried out with the media of the induction of American capital 
and technology. Japanese invasion to southeast Asia and Oceania, which is one of the 
conditions for the heavy and chemical industrialization, was also through the American 
commitment in Asia and the Pacific after the war. In short, Japan completed her heavy 
and chemical industrialization by joining in or taking advantage of the invasion (en-
largement of powers) of the American imperialism replacing the retreating old imperialis-
tic powers (Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, etc.) in Asia and the Pacific in the 
postwar period. Particularly, it coincides with the decline of Great Britain which used to 
be the most dominating power in Asia and Oceania (the last indication was the settlement 
for withdrawning troops in east of the Suez in 1971, which was decided at a time of de-
valuation of pound in 1967. 
It can be said that the postwar Japanese trade market which was organized on the 
premise of the cut-off from Chinese markets-which, needless to repeat, is indeed an 
II) Nakagawa, N., "Postwar Japanese Reproduction and Trade", The World Economic Review (in Japanese) , 
April 1971. 
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essential condition for the heavy and chemical industrialization of Japan or the reorganiza-
tion of reproduction structure-mainly consisted of such American markets and the South-
east Asian markets. 
However, it will be a mistake to ignore the aggravating tension and contradictions of 
relation of trade between Japan and U. s. A. which are brought about along with such 
processes. Therefore, it will be a mistake to comprehend generally the Japan-U. S. A. 
trade with the understanding of Japanese subordination to U. S. A. and backwardness 
in general. The postwar Japan-U. S. A. trade is different in nature from the prewar 
trade which depended on raw silk. 
On the other hand, it will also be a mistake, as Prof. Yoshimura did, to comprehend 
Japanese invasion to East Asia simply with Japanese subordination to U. S. A. In the 
course of 1960's, especially in the course of the intensification of the Vietnam War after 
1965, the weight of Japanese trade remarkably increased in this market. During this 
period, in East Asia except India and Pakistan, the import from Japan accounted for 
more than 30% of the total volume of imports and came to exceed the American share in 
this area. Although it is supported by dollar-scattering by U. S. A. and by the aids and 
investment by Japan herself subrogating U. S. A. as requested by U. S. A., it is a reality 
that the fact resulted in enhancing Japanese leadership and domination in this area. As 
a matter of fact, the processes were necessarily to involve confrontation against these 
Table 17. Ratio of Change of Major Developed Countries in Export and Import or 
Developing Area 
(Unit: %) 
Southeast A5ia i \V es tern Asia Latin America Africa 
------,-'-------
1961 1967 1961 1967 1961 1967 1961 1967 
-----------------",. 
Japan 9.8 17. I 9.6 19.0 3.0 4. 7 1.7 3.6 
U.S.A. 14.6 ! 22.5 6.4 3.5 37.5 34.6 8.6 7.8 Countries 
Great Britain 13.0 9.8 17.2 13.5 9.8 7.4 19.0 13.8 
to which 
18.9 France 2.0 1.6 7.7 7.9 2.8 2.9 20.5 
exported 
West Germany 4.4 4. I 9.4 7.0 5.9 6.4 7.2 11. 1 
Italy 1.7 1.6 8.6 11. 2 2.6 4.2 4.5 7.9 
---i--
3.9 9. I Japan ! 13. 1 22.3 4.9 7.2 3.0 4.3 
U.S.A. 17.2 24. 3 16.7 17.2 38.3 38.0 8.6 9.9 Countries 6.0 15.7 11. 4 Great Britain 11.8 7.7 16.0 14.2 7.6 from which 3.8 28.5 21.1 France 2. I 1.8 4.1 4.8 3.4 imported 
West Germany 6.0 5.8 I I. 0 II. 6 8.9 8.0 6.2 7.6 
Italy 1.4 1.9 i 4.0 5.5 3.1 2.8 3.2 5. 7 
Notice the increase of trade of U.S.A. and Japan in Southeast Asia and export from these two countries 
to all areas. On the contrarYl also notice that the trade of Great Britain receded in all areas, especially 
in Southeast Asia which was the major parts of the United Kingdom. Increase of raito of export of 
''':estern Asia to Japan indicates the increase of Mideastern petroleum export. 
The While Paper on Trade and Commerce (in Japanese), 1970. 
54 K. ONO 
regional communities and frictions with the capital of the existing developed countries led 
byU. S. A. 
(5) The difference will be evident when we examine the case of western Europe, 
especially EC countries (six countries of old EC) simply from the quantitative viewpoint. 
The American share in the exports from six countries of EC is merely 6.9% in 1955, 8.1 % 
in 1965, and 8.3% in 1970; in the imports it is only 14.9% in 1955,12.4% in 1965 and 11.2 
% in 1970. On the other hand, the share ofEC countries in the exports from EC is 32.8% 
in 1955,43.5% in 1965 and 48.9% in 1970; in the imports it is 32.5% in 1955,44.6% in 
1965 and 50.9% in 1970. Thus, the trade within the region is overwhelming. The 
weight of the entire Europe including EC in exports and imports of EC reaches 70%. 
Therefore, most part of the EC trade is within the European markets mainly consisting 
of the trade with EC itself, and trade with U. S. A. and underdeveloped countries is 
remarkably low. (In the case of Great Britain which recently joined in the EC and which 
depends heavily on U. S. A., the weight of U. S. A. in export is 11.7% in 1955, 14.8% 
in 1965 and 15.2% in 1970; in import the figures increase a little and yet it is 18.7% in 
1955, 19.5% in 1965 and 20.4% in 1970) The period in which EC heavily depended 
on U. S. A. is limited to that of the postwar recovery or the period of the practice of the 
Marshall Plan. 
